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A Matter of Interpretation? 
Understanding and Applying Mediation Standards for the Cross-Border 
Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements  
- Dorcas Quek Anderson 
 
1. Introduction 
 In late 2018, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution to adopt the 
UN Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation and 
to make corresponding amendments to the Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation (A/Res.73/198). This development is the culmination of several years of 
work by the UN Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) to create a 
multilateral instrument facilitating the cross-border enforcement of mediated settlement 
agreements. The convention was named the Singapore Convention on Mediation when it 
was signed by 46 countries on 7 August 2019. Six additional countries have signed the 
convention, bringing the total number of signatories to 52 (Tham, 2019; UNCITRAL, 
2020). The convention will enter into force on 12 September 2020 (United Nations, 
2020). 
 
The Singapore Convention on Mediation (“Singapore Convention”) is meant to 
achieve for mediation what the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) has done for international arbitration. 
The widespread support of the New York Convention – starting from 10 states in 1958 
and increasing to the current number of 161 states – attests to the popularity of arbitration 
as a mode of dispute resolution. By comparison, the high level of preliminary support for 
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the Singapore Convention within merely a few months attests to the common sentiment 
across the globe on the need for a uniform enforcement regime for mediation, and the 
desire to place the mediation process on equal standing with arbitration in terms of 
competitive advantages (Strong, 2016; UNCITRAL, February 2015). More importantly, 
it reflects the substantial growth of mediation that have fueled international efforts to 
develop a harmonized legal framework to support agreements resulting from mediation.  
 
Although the Singapore Convention drew inspiration from the New York 
Convention, the corresponding grounds for non-enforcement of the mediated settlement 
must necessarily reflect the distinctive features of the mediation process. In this regard, a 
contracting state is allowed to decline enforcement in the event of a “serious breach…of 
standards applicable to the mediator or mediation” (article 5(1)(e)). This article focuses 
on the future role to be played by domestic and international mediation standards in view 
of this provision, and the challenges arising from interpreting standards across different 
perspectives. It will be argued that the provision has effectively endowed mediation 
standards with an unprecedented level of significance. The standing of these mediation 
standards has been strengthened from soft regulatory codes that were previously 
connected only with disciplinary action of mediators to quasi-legal grounds impacting the 
enforcement of mediated settlements. Given the critical function accorded to mediation 
standards, it is imperative to facilitate an accurate and context-specific understanding of 
mediation standards so as to ensure the sound application of the Singapore Convention 
across different countries.  
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The discussion will be done in four sections. First, the role of the mediation 
standards will be examined in light of the grounds for non-enforcement in the Singapore 
Convention. It is argued that the relevant standards that apply to the mediation will 
assume much greater prominence than domestic mediation requirements in the state 
where mediation takes place or in the state deciding on enforcement. This development, 
coupled with how mediation standards now directly impinge on the enforceability of a 
mediated settlement, will result in greater significance being assumed by mediation 
standards in the future. The next section examines the nature of mediation standards. It 
will be demonstrated that the inherently generalized nature of codes of ethics and the 
inability to consider different contexts render them less amenable than legal rules to sound 
interpretation.  
 
The third section discusses an additional difficulty in interpreting standards – the 
plethora of frames that could be adopted by the courts. Mediation standards may be 
construed according to the “adjudication”, “arbitration” and “default mediation tradition” 
frames, leading to misapprehension of the relevant mediation standards. The fourth 
section explores the latter frame in greater detail, illustrating how the principle of self-
determination could be understood differently under the Singapore and Australian 
mediation standards. The final section proposes ways to assist the courts to bridge the 
plurality of frames so as to help them accurately situate the interpretation of mediation 
standards in the relevant context. A failure to do so potentially leads to the courts’ 
misinterpretation of well-established mediation standards, and the mediation profession 
falling into disrepute based on misguided application of mediation standards.  
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2. The future significance of mediation standards  
  
Article 5 of the Singapore Convention sets out the grounds for non-enforcement of 
the mediated agreement. Several of these grounds are synonymous with the equivalent 
provisions in the New York Convention, including a lack of capacity, a conflict with the 
enforcing state’s public policies and the subject matter not being capable of settlement by 
mediation. The more unique grounds are contained in article 5(1)(e) and (f), which 
provide that:  
 
5(1).  The competent authority of the Party to the Convention where relief is 
sought under article 4 may refuse to grant relief at the request of the party against 
whom the relief is sought only if that party furnishes to the competent authority proof 
that:  
… 
(e)  There was a serious breach by the mediator of standards applicable to the 
mediator or the mediation without which breach that party would not have 
entered into the settlement agreement; or  
(f)  There was a failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties circumstances 
that raise justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s impartiality or 
independence and such failure to disclose had a material impact or undue 
influence on a party without which failure that party would not have entered 
into the settlement agreement.  
  
There were strong views within the UNCITRAL Working Group that professional 
mediation rules apart from party autonomy should be endorsed as due process principles 
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within the mediation process (UNCITRAL, Sept 2015). Consequently, the Working 
Group agreed to include a ground relating to fair treatment according to “standards 
applicable to the mediation or mediator”, and another ground relating to the mediator’s 
failure to disclose information that was likely to “raise justifiable doubts as to the 
mediator’s impartiality or independence” (UNCITRAL, Sept 2016). A high threshold was 
further created by requiring a “serious breach” of mediation standards in article 5(1)(e), 
and a failure to disclose information that “had a material impact or undue influence on a 
party” in article 5(1)(f). In addition, a strong causative requirement was introduced to 
these provisions; the misconduct had to be sufficiently serious, “without which failure (or 
breach) that party would not have entered into the settlement agreement”. 
 
Article 5(1)(e) refers to “standards applicable to the mediator or mediation”. 
Mediation standards usually stipulate guidelines on a range of issues, including the 
mediator’s professional qualifications, measures of mediator competence and guidelines 
for the practice of mediation. This article focuses on the latter aspect – guidelines on how 
mediation should be conducted (“mediation standards”). Most agreements to mediate 
cross-border disputes specify the relevant standards that apply to the mediation. 
Mediation standards in nation-wide accreditation systems usually take the form of codes 
of conduct highlighting salient ethical principles. For instance, the mediation standards 
in Australia’s National Mediator Accreditation System (“NMAS”) identify principles 
including accountability, self-determination, informed consent and safety. They also 
elaborate on how the mediation process should be conducted based on these principles. 
A similar standards-setting body in Singapore, the Singapore International Mediation 
Institute (“SIMI”), has established a code of professional conduct alluding to principles 
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such as diligence, impartiality, fairness and voluntariness. Mediation standards have also 
been created by private providers of mediation services including JAMS Mediation, 
Arbitration and ADR Services, the American Arbitration Association, the International 
Mediation Institution, and the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution. 
 
Regardless of their scope, mediation standards are not intended to have the same 
binding effect as formal legislation. They have, after all, been created principally for self-
regulation of the mediation profession. In this regard, Spencer and Brogan (2006) noted 
that professional codes of conduct may be aspirational, educational or regulatory in 
purpose. The aspirational code articulates ideals that mediators should strive to adhere to, 
while the educational code seeks to provide guidance to the mediation profession. JAMS’ 
Mediators Ethics Guidelines provide an illustration of educational standards aiming to 
“provide basic guidance to…mediators regarding ethical issues that may arise 
during…the mediation process”. Breaches of these guidelines do not necessarily result in 
disciplinary action. The JAMS mediators are merely encouraged to confront ethical issues 
as soon as they become apparent and to seek guidance from the organization.  
 
By comparison, regulatory mediation standards that feature in many national 
accreditation systems have more detailed guidelines to serve as a basis for adjudicating 
grievances (Spencer and Brogan, 2006). Crowe (2017) described the regulatory model of 
professional ethics as being endorsed by the mediation community, taught as part of an 
accreditation process and often linked to licensing and adjudication of formal complaints 
about breaches. Despite the disciplinary function of regulatory standards, they lack the 
uniform applicability to all mediators within the jurisdiction. Accreditation under national 
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systems such as NMAS is usually done on a voluntary basis. The mediators who do not 
seek accreditation will not be subject to adjudication of complaints based on the relevant 
mediation standards. Hence, even if mediation standards were associated with 
disciplinary action, they do not have the similar breadth of applicability as formal 
legislation. In sum, mediation standards, as soft forms of regulation, have never assumed 
the traditional functions and coercive effect of legislation.   
 
However, the introduction of article 5 of the Singapore Convention arguably 
transforms and elevates the above functions played by domestic and international 
mediation standards. First, the standing of mediation standards has been strengthened 
from soft regulatory codes hitherto connected only with disciplinary action of mediators 
or educational standards, to quasi-legal standards impacting the cross-border enforcement 
of mediated settlement agreements. A serious breach of the principle of impartiality under 
the NMAS Mediation Standards may result not only in sanctions being imposed on the 
mediator under the NMAS system, but also in the denial of the legal effect of mediated 
settlement terms in another country. The specific principles articulated in mediation 
standards thus gain a status almost akin to procedural law, for they now constitute 
substantive grounds to disallow the enforcement of mediated settlements.  
 
Furthermore, the bases for non-enforcement of a mediated settlement have been 
enlarged beyond the Singapore Convention to include external mediation standards 
drafted by mediation organizations and mediation regulatory bodies. This situation stands 
in contrast to Article V of the New York Convention, that has exhaustively listed all 
grounds for non-enforcement such as the failure to give notice of the appointment of the 
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arbitrator. In contrast, external mediation standards are invariably mutable, being subject 
to potential revision by the relevant drafting bodies. Hence, the grounds for non-
enforcement of mediated settlements are effectively open-ended.   
 
 On a related point, individual states where the mediation takes place have very little 
control over the applicable mediation standards under the Singapore Convention. Under 
the conventional practice of international arbitration, there is usually a clear nexus 
between the seat or location of arbitration and the law governing the arbitration. The 
arbitration will be governed by the law of the place where it is held, and the parties may 
rely on the state to support the arbitral process. In stark contrast, under the Singapore 
Convention, the mediation standards of the relevant mediation institution or accreditation 
body assume much greater importance than the domestic requirements of the state where 
the mediation takes place. The state where the mediation occurs is unable to impose its 
mediation standards and is consequently unable to exert control over the enforceability 
of the settlement. Schnabel (2019) has thus commented that the Singapore Convention 
has made the mediated agreement “a stateless instrument that is generally not subject to 
domestic law requirements”. Furthermore, the relevant mediation may not only be 
different from the location of the mediation, but also have transnational application. 
Consider for instance the International Mediation Institution (“IMI). The IMI Code of 
Mediator Conduct could constitute the applicable mediation standards used to consider 
whether a mediated agreement is enforceable. Yet this code of conduct is not associated 
with any one country’s law because its mediators come from a wide range of countries; 
it is a transnational set of standards traversing many countries. Consequently, the 
enforcement of a mediated agreement under the Singapore Convention is dissociated 
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from the location of the mediation, and correspondingly more intimately connected with 
the mediation institutions that the mediator is linked to. 
 
In summary, the Singapore Convention has endowed mediation standards with an 
unprecedented level of significance. Where they used to provide guidance to mediators 
or educate the public, they are now potentially grounds used to determine the 
enforceability of mediated agreements. The content of the applicable standards is not 
necessarily determined by states, but principally by mediation institutions and 
professional bodies that have the freedom to amend the standards as they deem fit. In 
addition, the relevant standards that apply to the mediator assume much greater 
prominence than domestic mediation requirements existing in the state where mediation 
takes place.  
 
Given the critical role that will be accorded to mediation standards, it is vital to 
ensure that contracting states of the Singapore Convention have an accurate and context-
specific understanding of domestic and international mediation standards. It is 
particularly important to understand what type of breaches of mediation standards 
constitute “serious breach[es]” that could undermine the enforceability of the mediated 
agreements. The next section turns to discuss the nature of mediation standards which 
will impinge on the accuracy in the courts’ interpretation of them.   
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3. The nature of mediation standards 
 
The preceding section alluded to the multiple functions of mediation standards, 
ranging from regulatory to educational purposes. Arguably, a code of conduct 
underpinned by a regulatory goal should provide minimal standards and detailed guiding 
principles that will assist a court deciding whether there are serious breaches of mediation 
standards under article 5 of the Singapore Convention. By contrast, the aspirational code 
of conduct may contain additional principles exceeding the minimal standards that are 
used to deal with complaints. Nonetheless, in practice most mediation codes of conduct 
are likely to amalgamate several purposes. MacFarlane (2002) noted in this regard that 
codes of conduct exert moral and political significance by setting benchmarks for 
appropriate conduct, provide a means to ascertain a mediator’s commitment to a set of 
values, deal with complaints, and provide the trappings of respectability for the 
profession. Unlike formal legislation, the multiple functions of mediation standards could 
be fundamentally misaligned with the primary purpose of the Singapore Convention to 
delineate the circumstances for enforcement of a mediated agreement.  
 
More significantly, mediation standards are subject to two limitations that 
collectively result in substantial difficulties in application by the courts. First, the inherent 
generality of the principles articulated means that “no code of conduct can provide full 
answers for all the situations that may transpire in a mediation” (Astor and Chinkin, 
1991). Expressing the same sentiments, Field and Boulle (2017), quoting Grebe, Irvin 
and Lang (1989), commented that “the best code of professional conduct can provide only 
partial direction” and “do not (and cannot) provide definitive answers”. Elaborating on 
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this limitation, MacFarlane (2002) noted that codes of conduct only offer general 
guidance for selected issues, but that the application of these principles requires the 
exercise of personal discretion within an organic and dynamic mediation process. 
Honoroff and Opotow (2007) further observed that many codes of conduct begin with 
abstract principles, proceeding from a conception of the mediator’s role before deducing 
the ethical mandates from this conception. In sum, the generalized nature of the ethical 
principles does not make them amenable to application to specific circumstances. If 
mediators themselves face considerable difficulty in applying the current standards, the 
courts will a fortiori find it much more challenging to decide whether the applicable 
mediation standards were breached under the Singapore Convention.  
 
 Second, mediation standards based on general principles are unable to take into 
account the different contexts in which mediation takes place. Cooks and Hale (1994) 
have asserted that ethical choices in mediation take place “as part of the sense making in 
everyday, mundane experience”. Many commentators have therefore advocated for a 
contextual approach to applying mediation ethics. In support of Cooks’ discursive ethics, 
MacFarlane (2002) suggested a reflexive approach in analyzing outcomes of ethical 
judgments based on the mediator’s contextual perspective. In the same vein, Field (2017) 
suggested a contextual ethical method to mediation that would respond to the unique 
character of the mediation process, be sensitive to the particular circumstances of the 
parties and the dispute, and accommodate a wide variety of mediation styles. Crowe 
(2015) has advocated a practice model of ethics, which regards ethical discourse as being 
shaped by normative pre-reflective judgments emerging through repeated engagement 
with situations. Similarly, Waldman (2011) has proposed the approach of “ethical 
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intuitionism”, which is drawn from philosopher Ross’s approach of weighing and 
balancing competing values in a fluid and intuitive way. 
 
While a contextual approach may assist mediators in overcoming the limitations 
of ethical codes, it is questionable whether the court deciding on enforcement of a 
mediated settlement is able to adopt such a nuanced approach in interpreting mediation 
standards. The courts, being an external party that has not participated in the mediation, 
is understandably disadvantaged in terms of grasping the nuances of the mediation 
context. These difficulties could be further aggravated by the multiple frames through 
which the courts may interpret the relevant mediation standards. The next section 
elaborates further on the potential frames that the courts may mistakenly adopt.      
 
 
4. Interpreting mediation standards: A plethora of frames of reference 
 
As discussed above, article 5(1)(e) of the Singapore Convention empowers the 
court in a signatory state to refuse enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement if it 
is satisfied that there was a serious breach of mediation standards. The court would be 
required to analyze standards that are unfamiliar because they could be drafted by external 
mediation organizations or other countries’ mediation regulatory systems. Admittedly, 
the courts are gaining more experience in interpreting and applying external law. For 
instance, parties involved in legal proceedings in the Singapore International Commercial 
Court may agree to apply English law to their dispute, and the lawyers would then make 
submissions to apprise the court on the English position of the relevant area of law (Order 
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110, Rules of Court). Nonetheless, the interpretation of mediation standards presents new 
and greater difficulties because of the high likelihood of the courts interpreting the 
standards from different frames of reference as it seeks to accurately understand the 
mediation process. As will be explained below, the adoption of any one of these frames 
will severely distort the understanding of mediation standards and have significant 
ramifications on the mediation profession.  
 
4.1 The “adjudication” frame 
 
The default perspective that courts may readily adopt relates to the adjudication 
mode of resolving disputes. Under the “adjudication” frame, mediation is likely to be 
perceived from the conventional principles of justice, resulting in misapprehended 
assessments of whether the relevant standards have been breached. By way of illustration, 
it is common for mediation standards to refer to principles of fairness (“SIMI Code”). 
However, a court’s conceptualization of fairness differs vastly from how justice is 
understood within consensual processes. The historical debates concerning the benefits 
of settlement ultimately stem from an appraisal of mediation from a predominant 
“adjudication” frame linked to legal rights. The oft-cited criticisms of Fiss and Genn have 
portrayed mediation as settlement endeavors devoid of any considerations of justice. 
Genn (2013) noted that “mediation requires the parties to relinquish ideas of legal rights 
during mediation and focus, instead, on problem-solving”. Hence, using this frame, the 
courts are likely to assess the mediation outcome as unfair because the mediated 
agreement is assessed based on its conformity with legal norms.  
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Although some concerns raised by the critics – such as the need to deal with 
pronounced power imbalances – warrant attention, it is essential that the courts do not 
evaluate the fairness of the mediation outcome based merely on a narrow application of 
legal principles. The mediation process is meant to allow the discussion of the parties’ 
interests, which may be much broader than legal principles. Legal principles are part and 
parcel of the broad milieu of concerns that are brought to the mediation table. Hyman 
(2005) stated in this regard that the parties’ sense of fairness and justice is placed on equal 
footing with the various other interests. Unlike in adjudication, the legal principles may 
not eventually be given precedence because the parties balance them against other more 
pressing needs. Menkel-Meadow (1995) highlighted that there are many other 
components to the achievement of justice, including consensus and party empowerment. 
Settlement, in her view, considers many other non-legal principles affecting decision-
making, and is often more “just” and responsive to the parties’ needs than a litigated 
outcome with binary win-lose results. 
 
Hence, there is a grave danger of the courts adopting the “adjudication” frame due 
to a lack of understanding of the fundamental differences between adjudicatory and 
consensual dispute resolution processes. As a result, the mediated outcome may run the 
risk of being evaluated against the courts’ conceptualizations of substantive fairness.  
 
4.2 The “arbitration” frame 
 
 Although arbitration is also an adjudicatory dispute resolution process, the 
“arbitration” frame raises unique issues in the interpretation of mediation standards. One 
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such issue relates to how procedural fairness within mediation is understood. Because an 
arbitral award is premised on due process in decision-making by the arbitrator, the aspects 
of due process involve procedural matters such as proper notice of the appointment of the 
arbitrator, opportunity to present one’s case and the arbitral tribunal having a composition 
reflecting the parties’ agreement (articles V(1)(b) and (d), New York Convention). By 
contrast, due process within mediation relates to more intangible principles such as giving 
parties equal treatment and ensuring that the parties reach an agreement based on 
informed consent. Mediation focuses principally on the parties’ decision-making process 
instead of the procedures impacting the decision made by the neutral.  
 
 The UNCITRAL working group discussions reflect palpable tensions between the 
“mediation” and “arbitration” frames.  Some delegates argued that mediator misconduct 
should taint the entire mediation process, similar to how a failure to comply with the 
agreed arbitral procedure was a specific reason to disallow enforcement under article 
V(1)(d) of the New York Convention (UNCITRAL, Feb 2016). In response, other 
delegates stated that mediator misconduct should not have an impact on the enforcement 
of the settlement agreement because the parties were free to withdraw from the mediation 
at any time if they believed that they were being treated unfairly. The Working Group 
reached a compromise by including mediator misconduct as a ground for non-
enforcement under article 5, but requiring such misconduct to cause the relevant party to 
agree to the settlement terms. A breach of mediation standards per se is insufficient to 
fulfil article 5(1)(e). It is therefore possible that the court adopting an “arbitration” frame 
may focus unduly on the breach of standards alone, and neglect the need under the 
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Singapore Convention to assess whether the breach had exerted a great impact on the 
parties’ decision-making capacity.  
 
 Another issue arises from the Singapore Convention’s borrowing of language from 
the New York Convention. Article 5(1)(b) of the Singapore Convention does not allow 
enforcement of an MSA that is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed under the law parties have validly subjected [the mediation] or…under the law 
deemed applicable by the competent authority”. The Working Group drew this language 
from articles II(3) and V(1)(a) of the New York Convention that referred to when 
agreements to arbitrate would be deprived of legal effect (UNCITRAL, Sept 2015). The 
contractual framework in analyzing the validity of an arbitration agreement was 
effectively transplanted into the Singapore Convention to form grounds of non-
enforcement of the mediated settlement agreement. The Working Group explained that 
this “generic nature” of analysing agreements, which has been interpreted by several 
jurisdictions in a harmonised fashion, could be relied on to determine whether there was 
a valid mediated settlement agreement. As such, the common grounds rendering a 
contract void or voidable, such as duress and fraud, could invalidate the mediated 
settlement under article 5(1)(b) (UNCITRAL, Sept 2016).  
 
 Article 5(1)(b) of the Singapore Convention, which mirrors the corresponding text 
in the New York Convention, ostensibly contains a ground that is separate from article 
5(1)(e) concerning the serious breach of mediation standards. However, they are 
overlapping grounds. The existence of vitiating factors in contract law effectively means 
that the parties’ autonomy has been undermined. The court’s finding of undue influence 
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resulting in an invalid mediated agreement will probably correspond with a finding that 
there is serious breach of mediation standards relating to the mediator respecting the 
parties’ right of self-determination. Because of the close connection between these two 
grounds of non-enforcement, it is not inconceivable for the courts to strictly apply 
contractual principles to determine whether there have been serious breaches of mediation 
standards under article 5(1)(e). Its analysis will then be limited to determining whether 
the elements of duress, undue influence etc. have been fulfilled. Although contractual 
principles may shed some light on the interpretation of mediation standards, they cannot 
replace a context-specific interpretation of mediation standards.   
 
4.3 The “default mediation tradition” frame 
 Another frame which may result in misapprehension of mediation standards relates 
to the enforcing state’s mediation tradition. As explained above, the applicable mediation 
standards under article 5(1)(e) may not necessarily correspond with the domestic 
mediation standards in the enforcing state.  Consequently, the courts have to understand 
the external mediation organization’s or state’s views on the standards. Nevertheless, the 
plurality of mediation practices across jurisdictions potentially poses an obstacle to the 
court attaining an accurate understanding of these standards. There is naturally a high 
tendency to construe the standards according to one’s own mediation tradition.  Common 
mediation nomenclature could be ascribed different meanings under different mediation 
traditions. Boulle observed that the notions of independence, neutrality and the principle 
of self-determination “are regarded as axiomatic to mediation systems in many western 
contexts” but these concepts “can be alien and inappropriate in some mediation contexts, 
both traditional and contemporary, in Africa, Asia, Australia and the Pacific” (Boulle, 
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2014, p 52, 58). Notably, some UNCITRAL working group delegates stressed that 
mediators were not subject to the same impartiality requirements as arbitrators and judges 
(UNCITRAL, Feb 2016). They were more inclined to conclude that a lack of partiality 
did not amount to a serious breach of mediation standards as long as the parties 
themselves had no objections to the lack of neutrality. In a similar vein, some scholars 
have argued that neutrality – in terms of a lack of relationship between the mediator and 
the parties – is perceived differently in the Chinese context. They have pointed out that 
the concept of guanxi (interconnectedness and relationships) in China results in a 
preference for a mediator with some connection with the disputants. Such a person is 
more likely to be trusted by the parties (Low, 2011). Hence, although the same mediation 
term may be used in several mediation codes of conduct, the concept may be construed 
quite differently across varied mediation traditions.  
 
 An apt illustration relates to a prominent international mediation center in China – 
the CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Centre – that has cooperated with more than ten countries 
to set up cross-border mediation schemes. The center’s mediation rules oblige the 
mediator to “disclose any circumstances likely to affect his or her independence and 
impartiality as a mediator in the case” (article 21, CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules). 
There is no further elaboration on these circumstances. Suppose that these rules were 
applicable to a mediated settlement that the parties seek to enforce under the Singapore 
Convention, and it turns out that the mediator had previous business dealings with both 
parties. Will a strict or lenient threshold be used to determine whether the non-disclosure 
would raise justifiable doubts about the mediator’s independence under article 5(1)(f)? It 
is likely that a stricter standard would be used if the enforcing state is more familiar with 
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another mediation tradition that views mediator neutrality as a sacrosanct principle of 
mediation. Hence, the diversity of mediation standards could pose considerable 
challenges to the accurate application of the mediation standards.  
 
 The uncertainty caused by the adoption of the “default mediation tradition” frame 
could be more pronounced when the enforcing state is interpreting mediation codes of 
conduct that have transnational application. For instance, a cross-border mediation that is 
conducted by an American mediator under the auspices of CEDR will be subject to the 
CEDR Code of Conduct for Neutrals read in conjunction with the Model CEDR 
Mediation Procedure. The question may arise as to whether the mediator’s pressurizing 
of parties to settle amounts to a breach of the applicable mediation standards. The CEDR 
Code of Conduct makes no express reference to the principle of party self-determination, 
but the CEDR Model Procedure obliges the mediator to determine the procedure “in 
consultation with the parties”. Suppose that the enforcing state is the USA, and the court 
is most familiar with the US Model Standards for Mediators, which has specified self-
determination as a primary guiding principle. The court will probably face considerable 
ambivalence about whether to interpret the CEDR Code of Conduct in a more American-
centric manner, given that the code has transnational application to CEDR mediators. As 
such, the application of international mediation standards will pose no small challenge to 
the state deciding on enforcement under the Singapore Convention.  
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5. The potential clashes of frames: examining Singapore’s and Australia’s 
mediation standards 
 
Evidently, the enforcing state could adopt a plethora of perspectives in interpreting 
the relevant mediation standards under article 5. Any one of the above frames run the risk 
of deviating from a contextualized interpretation of the standards that is informed by the 
relevant jurisdiction’s or organization’s mediation traditions. This section illustrates the 
potential challenges arising from adopting the “default mediation tradition” frame in 
Singapore and Australia in interpreting mediation standards.  
 
Australia’s mediation standards under the National Mediation Accreditation 
System (“NMAS”) are rooted in a much longer history than the mediation standards 
promulgated by Singapore International Mediation Institute (“SIMI”).  The standards 
were introduced in 2008 after an eight-year period of consultation, and revised in 2012 
and 2015. SIMI, a national mediation standards body formed in 2014, similarly 
introduced a voluntary accreditation scheme for Singapore mediators. Accredited 
mediators are obliged to comply with SIMI’s Code of Professional Conduct, and breaches 
of the codes will be reviewed by SIMI’s Assessment of Professional Conduct process. 
Using International Mediation Institute’s Code of Conduct as a starting point, SIMI 
consulted with mediation organizations in Singapore before introducing the code in 2017 
(Lee & Lim, 2017). 
 
Both sets of standards aim to educate mediators on their minimum practice 
requirements and ethical obligations, inform participants about what to expect in 
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mediation, and regulate the mediation profession by using the standards as a basis to 
assess complaints lodged against mediators (section 1.2, NMAS Standards; Introduction, 
SIMI Code). In terms of topics discussed, there are substantial areas of overlap as 
illustrated in the Figure 1.  
 
Suppose that a mediation was conducted in Singapore by a mediator certified 
under NMAS. The applicable standards will thus be the Australian NMAS standards. One 
party is from Australia and the other from Singapore. In addition, the mediated settlement 
agreement fulfils the formality requirements of the Singapore Convention, and the parties 
are now seeking enforcement in the Singapore courts under the Singapore Convention. 
The issue confronting the Singapore courts is whether the mediator’s suggestion of 
solutions and giving of opinions have seriously breached the principle of self-
determination. The ensuing discussion will highlight the potential clashes between the 
Singapore and Australian mediation traditions in interpreting this principle in the NMAS 
standards.  
 
Self-determination is indubitably a foundational guiding principle of the modern 
mediation movement. The emphasis on party autonomy – and conversely the lack of 
mediator input on the content of the mediation – has permeated many a mediation model, 
including the facilitative and transformative models. According to this philosophy of 
party empowerment and exercise of autonomy, the parties delimit their own agenda and 
fashion their agreements (Douglas, 2012). Welsh (2000) elaborated that this principle 
results in the parties being at the center of the mediation process, actively participating in 
the negotiation, choosing the norms to guide them in decision-making, creating options, 
This is the version submitted to Conflict Resolution Quarterly for publication. The final published version may 
be accessed at https://doi.org/10.1002/crq.21285 
 
 22 
and deciding whether or not to settle. The relevance of self-determination in all mediation 
processes is undisputed. It is, after all, a feature that distinguishes mediation from 
adjudicatory processes. Nevertheless, the thornier questions relate to the degree of 
prominence of self-determination within different mediation traditions.  
 
5.1 Australia NMAS Mediation Standards 
 
Australia’s practice standards stress the pre-eminence of self-determination, 
stating at the outset that mediation “promotes the self-determination of participants” and 
the mediator supports the parties in engaging in negotiation, communication, identifying 
and clarifying interests, considering alternatives, generating options and reaching their 
own decisions (section 2.2, NMAS Standards). This description strikingly mirrors 
Welsh’s depiction of the participants being at the center of the mediation process. Douglas 
(2017) noted that the decision to highlight this principle in the 2015 practice standards as 
an ethical standard confirms the understanding of self-determination as the defining 
feature of mediation. 
 
Self-determination appears to be closely connected with the concept of 
voluntariness in arriving at a final decision in the mediation, without being pressurized 
by the mediator. Wolski (2017, p 64) suggests that the definition of self-determination is 
found in section 7.4 which obliges mediator to “support participants to reach agreements 
freely, voluntarily, without undue influence and on the basis of informed consent” 
(emphasis added). Wolski (2017, p 71) also notes how the current standards closely 
resemble the definition of self-determination in US Model Standards of Conduct for 
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Mediators as “the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced decision in which each party 
makes free and informed choices as to process and outcome”.  Similarly, Ojelabi and 
Noon (2014) observe that a clear links exists between self-determination and 
voluntariness; the terms of agreement are not to be imposed on the participants in order 
for the mediation to conform to the spirit of self-determination. 
 
The NMAS standards have commented on the mediator practice of giving advice 
in light of the above principle of self-determination. Such advice is allowed in a blended 
process when the participants have consented to the use of such a process, and the advice 
“is provided in a manner that maintains and respects the principle of self-determination” 
(section 10.2). It is noteworthy that the 2012 standards stressed that the primary 
responsibility to resolve the dispute rests with the participants, and that the mediator 
should therefore not pressure them into an agreement or make a substantive decision on 
behalf of any participant (section 9.8). Hence, there is a palpable emphasis on subjecting 
the mediator’s advice or any other evaluative techniques to the views of the participants; 
their actions should not be perceived as applying undue pressure on them such that their 
freedom to decide is diminished. The repeated references to consent and self-
determination within the standards indicate an unequivocal emphasis on the parties, rather 
than the mediator, as the center of the process. In this connection, Field has proposed an 
ethical paradigm that centralizes self-determination as the aim of mediation practice. She 
proposed analyzing the mediator’s situational interventions through the lenses of whether 
self-determination is supported, and subject to the overriding principle that mediators do 
not impose decisions (Field, 2011). 
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Turning then to examine the alleged expression of opinions by the mediator, it is 
highly likely that the mediator’s actions will be evaluated holistically under the Australian 
standards, taking into account the overall context and the cumulative impact of the 
mediator’s suggestions on the participants. Because the standards expressly subordinate 
the mediator’s interventions to the overarching principle of self-determination, the 
participants’ assessment on whether they felt unduly pressured will probably be given 
considerable weight.  
 
5.2 Singapore’s Mediation Standards 
 
Nevertheless, the same approach may not necessarily be adopted once the frame 
shifts from the Australian to the Singaporean mediation tradition. The principle of self-
determination is not explicitly mentioned in the SIMI code. Section 5.8 does allude to the 
principle by stating that the mediator will ensure that the agreement is arrived at 
“voluntarily and with the consent of all parties”. This appears to resemble section 7.4 of 
the NMAS standards that also refers to the idea of participants arriving at a voluntarily 
settlement with informed consent. Nonetheless, there is no equivalent elevation of the 
principle of self-determination in other parts of the SIMI code. The introductory portion 
highlights the importance of trust in the mediator’s integrity “in terms of competence, 
diligence, neutrality, independence, impartiality, fairness and the ability to respect 
confidences”.  There is a conspicuous absence of the principles of self-determination, 
voluntariness or consent.  Hence, unlike the NMAS standards, the pre-eminence of self-
determination within mediation is not clearly established.   
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Despite the equivocal emphasis on self-determination as the defining feature of 
mediation, the SIMI code does ascribe significant weight to this principle when 
describing the use of evaluative practices. Although the code allows mediators to “draw 
on their expertise and experience to assist the parties in developing sustainable 
settlements”, the principle of party autonomy takes precedence (paragraph 5.10). The 
parties must consent to this approach and the mediator is warned against “prescribing 
solutions or offering any statement, suggestion, or value judgment which may create an 
undue influence on any one party towards accepting a specific outcome”. It therefore 
appears that the SIMI code adopts the same approach as the NMAS standards in 
subordinating the practices of blended processes to the principle of self-determination.   
 
Be that as it may, it is highly unlikely that the parties’ subjective assessments 
concerning the lack of voluntariness will be given the same weight under the SIMI code 
as the NMAS standards. Although the text of the SIMI code gives precedence to the 
concept of party autonomy, it is crucial to note how self-determination has been 
understood within the Singapore mediation tradition. While the mediation movement 
started in Singapore in the courts and in the community with the call to embrace a less 
confrontational way of resolving disputes, it is noteworthy that the overriding emphasis 
was more on preserving harmony than on maximising party autonomy. The former Chief 
Justice Yong Pung How, when introducing court-connected mediation, stressed that 
Singapore was developing mediation as a non-confrontational way of resolving disputes 
to preserve relationships. He suggested that preserving relationships was an important 
value in an Asian society like Singapore. CJ Yong saw the promotion of mediation as a 
means to revive the historical ways of dealing with conflicts by relying on community 
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elders and clans (Yong, 1997). Similarly, community mediation centres were established 
because of the observation of the general reluctance of Singaporeans to litigate. 
Community Mediation Centres were set up to foster social cohesion and revive the 
traditional approach of resolving disputes through informal channels in decentralised 
systems. The same sentiments were expressed before the creation of the Singapore 
Mediation Centre, a commercial organisation providing paid mediation services.  This 
development found its genesis in a call by former Attorney General Chan Sek Keong to 
resolve disputes amicably because litigation, being a zero-sum game with some degree 
of animosity, frequently affected harmonious relationships (Chan, 1996). Undoubtedly, 
the origins of the mediation movement in Singapore were premised more on consensus 
and amicable resolution of conflicts than the exercise of self-determination. 
The initial sentiments of reviving indigenous forms of justice subsequently 
culminated in concrete efforts to develop a mediation model that was more attuned to 
Asian culture. In 2002, CJ Yong commented that it was ironic that “we had to relearn 
mediation from the West”. He stated that the facilitative model of mediation that was 
transplanted into Singapore might benefit from an infusion of Asian perspectives, 
including considerations of “face” and the expectation that the mediator provided input 
and guidance on substantive matters. Following these comments, the Singapore 
Mediation Centre convened a working group to study how an Asian model of mediation 
could be developed. Their efforts culminated in the publication of an influential book, An 
Asian Perspective on Mediation, which offered a methodology of contextualising the 
interest-based and facilitative mediation model to suit more Asian-oriented assumptions. 
The authors Teh and Lee suggested that many Asian societies tend to place great 
importance on hierarchical relationships and more weight on the collective rather than 
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the individual interests, as evidenced by the high power-distance index and the low 
individualism-collectivism score in Geert Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions (Teh and Lee, 
2009). Many of the cultural assumptions underlying the facilitative mediation model are 
therefore incompatible with Asian preferences. Notably, general expectations about 
individual autonomy stand in stark contrast with the primacy of social hierarchy in some 
Asian societies. Because of these tensions, they suggested that a more Asian-oriented 
approach requires the mediator, and not the parties, to be at the heart of the mediation. 
The primacy of social hierarchy in some Asian societies may lead to parties to expect 
guidance from the mediator in the form of giving input and expressing opinions. The 
disputing parties, who may not be accustomed to being the sole locus of decision-making, 
may be frustrated when prompted by the mediator to make their own decisions (Teh and 
Lee, 2009, p 12-13). 
The above discourse within the Singapore mediation community strongly 
suggests that self-determination may not be as prominent a concept for mediations within 
Singapore in comparison to Australia. These views appear slightly incongruous with the 
SIMI code’s exhortation to give deference to the principle of self-determination and avoid 
undue influence. The Asian approach, which puts the mediator at the heart of the 
mediation, is premised on the assumption that the parties do not value self-determination 
as highly as their western counterparts. Can the mediator who utilises a more evaluative 
approach assume that the parties have consented to this approach, or does he or she have 
to specifically obtain the parties’ consent? The SIMI code seems to suggest that consent 
must be expressly obtained. Furthermore, even if the parties gave their consent to this 
approach, is there still the possibility that the mediator’s directive and evaluative 
interventions will be deemed to have undermined the participants’ voluntariness in 
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arriving at a settlement? There are evidently difficulties in interpreting the SIMI code 
consistently with the “Asian” approach. The prominent motif of an Asian approach within 
the Singapore mediation tradition strongly suggests that self-determination may not be 
given as much weight under the SIMI code compared to the NMAS standards.  
We return now to the hypothetical scenario of a mediation conducted in Singapore 
by a mediator certified under the NMAS scheme, involving participants from Australia 
and Singapore. The Singapore courts will have to determine under the Singapore 
Convention whether there was a serious breach of mediation standards. However, it may 
readily use its default “Singapore mediation tradition” frame to interpret the Australian 
standards and consequently fail to give due weight to the pre-eminence of self-
determination within Australia. It is plausible that the mediator’s evaluations or 
suggestions may be less readily deemed by the Singapore courts as infringing the parties’ 
right of self-determination. The adoption of the “default mediation tradition” frame will 
therefore lead to immense difficulties in applying external mediation standards accurately 
with awareness of the relevant state’s mediation traditions. 
 
 
6. The critical importance of bridging frames for the post-Singapore 
Convention world  
 
Given the integral role that will be played by mediation standards in the post-
convention world, it is crucial to facilitate accurate understanding of the existing 
mediation standards across different states. The mediation communities have to devise 
ways to bridge frames to assist courts to situate their interpretation of mediation standards 
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in the relevant context. A failure to do so potentially leads to the courts’ misinterpretation 
of well-established mediation standards, and the mediation community falling into 
disrepute based on inaccurate application of mediation standards.  
 
 The current forms of mediation standards suffer from several limitations that render 
it exceedingly challenging for courts to bridge frames and contexts. Unlike the situation 
when evidence of foreign law can be given in court, there is sparse evidence of how 
mediation standards have been interpreted. Additionally, there is generally a lack of 
guiding notes on mediation standards, such as travaux preparatoires, to guide the court 
in interpreting the standards. The lack of detailed elaboration on mediation standards will 
exacerbate the difficulty enforcing states may face in applying the grounds of non-
enforcement in the Singapore Convention.  
 
 To facilitate greater understanding of how different mediation standards are to be 
properly interpreted, it will be beneficial for mediation codes of conduct to be 
accompanied by detailed explanatory notes or commentaries. For example, the reporter 
notes accompanying the 2005 US Model Code of Conduct for Mediators contain 
substantial information on the background prompting the amendment of the code and the 
rationale underlying the modification of each principle (American Bar Association, 
2005). The notes also outline the public feedback given on the earlier version and explain 
how the amended code has addressed these concerns. Another case in point is a 
commentary to the Australian National Mediation Standards. This official commentary 
also summarized the feedback given on the draft standards, and provided explanations on 
each of the finalized standards (Sourdin, 2007). There are existing domestic and 
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international mediation bodies that will have the capability to provide similar explanatory 
notes to their mediation standards. It will be in the interest of each mediation organization 
or state to provide commentaries on their respective codes of conduct to ensure that their 
standards are properly interpreted by other states.  
 
 Apart from providing commentaries, mediation organizations could also draft their 
standards in a more detailed manner. A bare reference to concepts such as neutrality and 
confidentiality, without the provision of specific illustrations showing when these 
concepts are breached, is hardly beneficial to the mediator, much less the courts that are 
interpreting the standards when applying the Singapore Convention. The Australian 
Mediation Standards provide an apt illustration of providing ample details. It has 
elaborated on the types of mediation behavior that promote the parties’ exercise of self-
determination, and how blended processes may be properly conducted. Likewise, the 
CEDR Code of Conduct, read in conjunction with the Model Mediation Procedure, 
highlights the primary mediation ethical standards and also shows how the recommended 
best practices further these standards. Another example is the specific illustrations in the 
European Code of Conduct on the types of information impinging on impartiality that the 
mediator should disclose to the parties.  
 
 In addition, it will be prudent for parties who wish to rely on the Singapore 
Convention to specify which set of mediation standards apply to their cross-border 
mediation. It is common for professional mediators to be accredited under multiple 
accreditation systems and mediation organizations across different countries. Several 
mediation codes of conduct would then concurrently apply to the mediation, resulting in 
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ambiguity concerning the “applicable” set of mediation standards to be used under article 
5(1)(e).  It will therefore be good practice for parties to stipulate prior to the mediation 
the specific set of mediation standards that apply.   
 
 As the Singapore Convention enlarges the role played by mediation standards, it is 
crucial to acknowledge that mediation standards will no longer remain as soft forms of 
regulation. They now have the additional function of impacting the enforceability of the 
mediated settlement agreement. The elevation of their status necessitates the refinement 
of mediation standards to resemble legal rules in degree of clarity. Granted that ethical 
codes may never be drafted with the same exactitude as legislation, there are many ways 
to facilitate the understanding of the general principles articulated.  It is hoped that 
external commentaries and notes on existing mediation standards will be more common 
in the future. These resources will be helpful in elucidating how mediation concepts may 
be interpreted differently across diverse frames, and facilitate the building of 
jurisprudence across different states on the application of the Singapore Convention. 
They will help prevent courts from adopting the wrong frame when construing external 
mediation standards and consequently further the underlying goals of many mediation 
organizations in promulgating standards. Apart from helping to bridge frames, these 
measures could also provide a much-needed catalyst to harmonize mediation standards 
across jurisdictions and institutions and gain a deeper understanding of inherent 
differences. The signing of the Singapore Convention has marked a significant milestone 
in the development of cross-border mediation. Its effectiveness has to be ensured in the 
future through cross-border understanding and elucidation of mediation standards.  
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Figure 1 
 NMAS Practice Standards SIMI Code of Conduct 
Key features of mediation Promotes self-determination; 
mediator supports parties. 
Third-party neutral assists parties 
in a dialogue oriented toward 
managing conflict or resolving a 
dispute. 
The mediation process:   
Pre-mediation Recommends areas to be 
covered in intake process 
Mediator to ensure parties 
understand process, roles, and 
consent to specific process 
Mediation process 
 
 
Refers to ordinary inclusion of 
joint session, and possibility of 
separate sessions 
No reference to recommended 
joint sessions or private session 
 
Termination  Terminate mediation if 
mediation not productive or 
suitable (e.g. misuse of process, 
no good faith, safety at risk) 
Terminate mediation if mediation 
likely to assume unconscionable or 
illegal character, or result in 
settlement infringing public policy 
Charging for services and 
promotion of services 
Agreement to be obtained on fee 
arrangements; fee structure 
cannot be based on mediation 
outcome 
Agreement to be obtained on fee 
arrangements; fee structure cannot 
be based on mediation outcome 
Ethical principles:  
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Impartiality and no 
conflict of interests 
Impartiality and procedural 
fairness 
• Duty to disclose potential 
grounds of bias of conflict of 
interest before and during 
process; 
• Mediator must not mediate 
case involving conflict 
without informed consent and 
only if conflict will not impair 
impartial conduct 
 
Impartiality, neutrality and 
independence 
• Must disclose information that 
will materially affect the above 
principles or place mediator in 
conflict with any parties, before 
and throughout process 
• Must treat all parties with 
fairness, equality and respect 
• Give equal opportunity to parties 
for private sessions; to raise 
issues and be heard, and to seek 
legal advice 
Confidentiality  • General duty to respect 
confidentiality arrangements, 
subject to exceptions 
• Obliged to informed 
participants of confidentiality 
before holding separate 
sessions 
• Mediator not required to 
retain documents relating to 
mediation, but should take 
care in storage and disposal of 
records 
General duty to respect 
confidentiality arrangements, 
subject to exceptions 
 
Self-determination / 
voluntariness 
• Mediation promotes the self-
determination of parties 
Mediator will ensure that in the 
event the parties arrive at an 
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 • Mediator does not evaluate or 
advise on merits of the dispute 
• Mediator must support 
participants to reach 
agreements freely, 
voluntarily, without undue 
influence and on the basis of 
informed consent 
 
agreement or settlement, that this is 
done voluntarily and with the 
consent of all parties  
 
Power and Safety • Mediator must be alert to 
changing balances of power 
and manage mediation 
accordingly 
• Must consider safety and 
comfort of participants and 
take recommended steps 
 
• No reference to power 
imbalances 
• Mediator will take reasonable 
steps to prevent any conduct 
that may invalidate an 
agreement, or create or 
aggravate a hostile environment 
at the mediation.  
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